房地產(chǎn)項目管理軟件
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馴服巨獸——大型建筑項目的管理策略
文/Mark Ingebretsen 譯/趙克琛
政治斗爭、預(yù)算超支和設(shè)計缺陷困擾著許多的大型項目。項目經(jīng)理可以通過一些創(chuàng)新和策略來避免上述令人頭痛的狀況。
建造圖庫魯伊大壩是一件異常艱巨的工作。圖庫魯伊大壩座落于巴西東北部偏遠繁茂的亞馬遜地區(qū)，大壩和相鄰的筑堤用長達12.5公里的混凝土圍成了一個面積達2850平方公里的湖區(qū)。
然而在圖庫魯伊大壩的建設(shè)過程中，問題突現(xiàn)出來：經(jīng)常會發(fā)生一些問題招致代價昂貴的決策，迫使原計劃變更。某些決策是在政治抗議的背景下做出的，比如使用昂貴的巴西水泥替代哥倫比亞的原材料。另外一些決策則起因于預(yù)期的資金未到位，例如，大壩水電站推遲三年投入使用。還有部分決策，像廢棄一種水閘系統(tǒng)以適應(yīng)運輸要求則是由費用原因引起的。在資金供給短缺時，通過火車取代駁船運輸?shù)V石則更為可行。
這些變更導(dǎo)致的一個結(jié)果是，在1974年估計預(yù)算36億美元的圖庫魯伊大壩最終在12年后交付時花費超過55億美元。
實際上，大型項目通常會因其導(dǎo)致的問題而聲名狼藉?！禡egaprojects and Risk》一書的作者本特·弗萊杰格、尼爾斯·布魯茲利斯和沃納·羅森加特爾表示：“現(xiàn)在存在一個矛盾：在全球計劃和建造更多更大建筑項目的同時，有個趨勢變得愈加明顯，即諸如此類的項目在經(jīng)濟、環(huán)境和公共支持上的記錄表現(xiàn)明顯差勁。
解決糾紛
政治因素會拖延項目數(shù)年并耗盡項目預(yù)算，而且還會導(dǎo)致更高的潛在費用。如下即是一個案例：伍德魯·威爾遜大橋由于其頻繁的推遲開工而廣為美國華盛頓的工人們熟知。大橋的設(shè)計車流量是每天7.5萬輛，而現(xiàn)在每天有超過20萬輛車過橋。盡管美國馬里蘭州和弗吉尼亞州都意識到擴建大橋的必要性，但是實際開工之前卻浪費了超過十年。
Washington Business Forward雜志指出：“數(shù)年來，馬里蘭州和弗吉尼亞州的州長們?yōu)榱祟A(yù)算超支部分的付費方和大橋的所有權(quán)等事情爭吵不休?！睋?jù)說，這些爭吵導(dǎo)致了3億美元的超支。
某些利益集團將大橋混亂的交通狀況當(dāng)作是促進自己計劃的機會，即通過修建一條橋上鐵路來擴展首都的地鐵系統(tǒng)。這個策略意味著將商業(yè)保留在華盛頓市區(qū)，這樣會限制郊區(qū)的蔓延。而另一些集團認(rèn)為增加威爾遜橋上車道的數(shù)量會減輕耗費巨大的交通混亂。
由于存在如此多的項目干系人，更多明智的項目經(jīng)理將糾紛解決方法寫入總體項目計劃中，帕特里克·韋弗如是說。韋弗是澳大利亞墨爾本的項目管理公司Mosaic項目服務(wù)公司的總監(jiān)。他認(rèn)為，當(dāng)紛爭發(fā)生時，外部專家會評估現(xiàn)狀并提供建議。
下一步，調(diào)節(jié)人會參與進來指定出折衷方案。調(diào)解失敗的話，就會訴諸仲裁，這樣，解決方案就是強制的。以上步驟失敗之后，耗時又昂貴的訴訟就是最后的手段了。
韋弗說，這套流程比較復(fù)雜，你必須了解采取每一步驟的適當(dāng)時機。例如，如果調(diào)解人過早地發(fā)揮作用，各方會感覺權(quán)利被剝奪而不會認(rèn)同調(diào)解人的方案。如果項目經(jīng)理讓調(diào)解人介入太晚的話，項目干系人會相互產(chǎn)生反感。
然而，在某些情況下，沒有足夠的時間執(zhí)行層層上報的糾紛解決方法。城市規(guī)劃和建筑師安德魯斯·杜安尼和伊麗莎白·普拉特－茲伊貝克設(shè)計了一種快速的協(xié)商機制，名為專家研討會議，實際上是一種多日集中計劃會議。
項目經(jīng)理與區(qū)域規(guī)劃官員合作設(shè)計出一種機制以確定參與研討會議的人員及達成共識的方法。接下來，研討會議會在項目現(xiàn)場或者附近召開。在一系列的會議上，工程師、建筑師和設(shè)計師與政客和當(dāng)?shù)刂С终呔陀媱澾M行討論以促成全體人員的接受。
項目規(guī)劃者甚至可以在會議現(xiàn)場設(shè)置一個設(shè)計室，這樣，建議和批準(zhǔn)的變更可以在它們被討論的同時被具體展現(xiàn)出來。當(dāng)結(jié)論確定下來后，批準(zhǔn)的計劃會發(fā)布出來。
避免超支
當(dāng)替換舊金山奧克蘭海灣大橋東側(cè)跨徑的計劃最初被提出時，預(yù)算是15億美元。四年后，據(jù)Engineering News Record報道，預(yù)算上升至28.7億美元。本特·弗萊杰格及其團隊認(rèn)為，在20個國家內(nèi)開展的大型項目中，實際上有90％經(jīng)歷過預(yù)算超支。他們研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，典型的項目超支大約為28％。
Danish公司報告顯示，超支的原因是由于項目贊助人低估了成本并且高估了收益以獲取決策者的支持?！巴崆聦嵲诎l(fā)展中國家非常嚴(yán)重，在美國等發(fā)達經(jīng)濟體中也廣泛存在?！?br>
但在某些情況下，項目計劃階段的每個人都可能成為過度樂觀估計的受害人?！绊椖窟M度變得越來越緊張；合同變得越來越嚴(yán)格；開工日期持續(xù)推后而結(jié)束時間卻沒有相應(yīng)延遲，這一切導(dǎo)致了極端壓縮的項目計劃?！崩省に固佤斊蘸腿A倫·P·內(nèi)勒做出如上解釋。斯特魯普是美國聯(lián)邦航空管理局（FAA）認(rèn)證及安全主管，內(nèi)勒是歐洲航天和防務(wù)公司BAE system公司的系統(tǒng)安全經(jīng)理。
斯特魯普和內(nèi)勒合著了一份題為《預(yù)算與進度——忽視的危險》的FAA研究報告，此報告關(guān)注于安全及其與預(yù)算超支的關(guān)系。他們注意到有時候快速跟進的進度不可更改，然而，項目本身卻可以更有效的運營。
兩位作者推薦了幾種有效的策略。例如，有些項目中的安全工程與開發(fā)團隊是分開的，這樣導(dǎo)致了兩個團隊的目標(biāo)不一致。如果兩個團隊合并，他們的目標(biāo)是一致起來。還有，項目經(jīng)理要清楚了解進度會如何影響安全和質(zhì)量，然后做出結(jié)果權(quán)衡。
技術(shù)悖論
還有一些目的是開發(fā)技術(shù)解決方案的大型項目步履蹣跚。看看磁懸浮鐵路吧，乍一看，磁懸浮是最優(yōu)雅的大規(guī)模運輸形式，列車沿著磁軌以300英里每小時的速度安靜地飛馳而過。德國耗資數(shù)百萬歐元研制載人磁懸浮原型以期保持他們在這個新興領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位。作為德國研發(fā)集團的一分子，西門子公司和蒂森克虜伯公司將開啟一個耗資60億歐元，長達185英里連接柏林和漢堡的鐵路線，但距開工數(shù)月前，項目被緊急叫停。
環(huán)保者擔(dān)憂磁懸浮列車對健康存在潛在危害。其他批評者聲稱在法國和日本已經(jīng)成功應(yīng)用的高速鐵路可以達到同等運力并且費用低廉。類似于先前被取消的協(xié)和式飛機，磁懸浮可能會變成技術(shù)解決方案而停滯不前。
這又是一個已經(jīng)耗資數(shù)百萬的項目由于政治因素受阻的案例?？尚械难a救措施是舉行那種類似于杜安尼和普拉特－茲伊貝克組織過的那種專家研討會，這樣可以及早地討論不同的意見。
私募資金同樣可以減少官僚主義形式。私募資金提供者更加傾向于經(jīng)濟上最優(yōu)解決方案而不是技術(shù)上的獨特方案。事實上，許多象菲律賓、馬來西亞、泰國和香港這樣的非工業(yè)國家和地區(qū)正在開發(fā)如大型收費公路等私募投資的項目。
有效設(shè)計
對于缺乏土地的城區(qū)，新式公路顯得不太實際。挑戰(zhàn)在于如何改建已有交通網(wǎng)絡(luò)以承載不斷增長的交通流量。自動收費系統(tǒng)或交通阻塞報警裝置會有些作用，但是只有在公路優(yōu)化設(shè)計能使駕駛者得到最有效的導(dǎo)航時，這些設(shè)施才起作用。
模擬確實會很有幫助：美國愛荷華大學(xué)的美國高級駕駛模擬器實驗室可以模擬公路交叉路口最復(fù)雜的混亂情形。實驗室首席技術(shù)官伊安尼斯·帕比利斯說：“這套模擬器是一個仿真程度很高的虛擬環(huán)境?！?br>
帕比利斯說：“駕駛者坐在像盒子一樣的模擬器里面的一輛真車?yán)铮h(huán)繞四周的屏幕顯示出虛擬的路況和50輛計算機模擬出來的汽車?！蹦M器還可以模擬出不同的天氣狀況、速度和交通流量。通過使用幾個人員測試項目，規(guī)劃者在開始具體實施建造之前就可以對他們自己的設(shè)計友好性有所把握。
帕比利斯說：“實際上，模擬器變成了一個虛擬的原型機，模擬出的任何明顯問題都會在設(shè)計時避免。
遺留問題
澳大利亞咨詢公司SMEC的庫馬認(rèn)為，大型項目本質(zhì)上會長期的耗費大量資金，這樣減少了項目規(guī)劃的靈活性。SMEC網(wǎng)站上的一份報告稱：“大型項目的管理極端復(fù)雜，在某些情況下好像任何人都控制不了?！倍遥鼈兊囊?guī)?？赡馨凳荆簩Νh(huán)境的影響是確定的，但可能難以預(yù)計影響的程度。
SMEC注意到，這些問題早在1970和1980年代就被世界銀行這樣的組織提出，但由于某些原因至今仍未解決。他們認(rèn)為，沒有證據(jù)表明建筑項目的規(guī)模因此受到限制。
掌握如何將象研討會、嚴(yán)格監(jiān)督、多樣融資和模擬等問題解決策略融合進項目計劃的項目經(jīng)理的前景被普遍看好。
作者簡介：Mark Ingebretsen為《華爾街日報》網(wǎng)絡(luò)版撰寫每日觀察專欄。他的新作《Why Companies Fail》已于2003年5月出版。
附文：案例分析
在當(dāng)今社會，資金快速流動，工程經(jīng)驗迅速共享，人們不能對創(chuàng)新思想有所保留。
●重新規(guī)劃香港國際機場。被正在擴建的香港赤臘角機場取代的閑置機場座落于世界上最昂貴的土地上。此規(guī)劃需要安排約有25萬居民的住房，包括交通干線、公園和娛樂設(shè)施等。
諸如此類的大型項目最為困難的工作在于設(shè)計一個總體規(guī)劃并讓所有項目干系人接受。在回收利用香港部分港口的問題上已存在爭論，可能的建筑污染問題也備受關(guān)注，還有部分的反對意見來源于缺乏一個統(tǒng)一的設(shè)計主題。
●達拉斯三叉河走廊工程?，F(xiàn)在的三叉河僅僅是一條“季節(jié)性河流”。不過，規(guī)劃者希望將它變成一個多季節(jié)的娛樂區(qū)域，包括湖區(qū)，綠化帶和具有未來開發(fā)潛力的公園。以上這些項目耗資預(yù)算達12億美元。
規(guī)劃過程就用了好幾年。直到現(xiàn)在，橫跨此區(qū)域的公園道路路線仍有六條提議。然而，規(guī)劃者試圖預(yù)見未來半個世紀(jì)達拉斯將會如何使用這個區(qū)域，以此來尋求使其設(shè)計經(jīng)受時間考驗。
●國家單軌鐵路網(wǎng)。部分規(guī)劃者相信，一個全國范圍內(nèi)的單軌鐵路網(wǎng)會無縫連接客貨運地鐵和時速達250英里每小時的長途列車。
一個提議方案是在公路上方修建單軌鐵路來覆蓋公路網(wǎng)。很顯然，這個方案會給設(shè)計者帶來挑戰(zhàn)，這需要提供住房和其他的城市用地。公路上方的空間甚至?xí)毁u給開發(fā)者以支付單軌鐵路的建設(shè)費用。
●白令海峽隧道。連接西伯利亞和阿拉斯加的隧道會極大地促進全球貿(mào)易。預(yù)計耗資400億美元的白令海峽隧道工程可能會成為歷史上最大的私募投資運輸建筑項目。
有兩個島嶼座落于海峽中間，這樣，實際的海底長度不會比英法海底隧道更長。然而，真正的挑戰(zhàn)在于如何連接世界兩極人口中心已有的工程。目前，白令海峽阿拉斯加端沒有公路或鐵路通往人類社區(qū)，據(jù)說俄羅斯端的距離更為遙遠。
原文：
Taming the Beast
By Mark Ingebretsen
Political infighting, cost overruns and faulty designs characterize many large projects. With a little project ingenuity and know-how, project managers can prevent these headaches.
Building the Tucurui Dam would not be easy. Located in northeastern Brazil’s lush and remote Amazon region, the dam and its adjacent dykes would encompass some 12,500 meters of concrete, creating a 2,850 square-kilometer lake.
However, problems cropped up during the Tucurui Dam’s construction – issues that often necessitated expensive decisions to change the original plan. Some decisions, including the use of more expensive Brazilian cement instead of material from neighboring Columbia, were made after political outcry. Others, such as the three-year delay in opening the dam’s hydroelectric power plant, resulted when expected funding didn’t materialize. Still other decisions, like the one to abandon a planned system of locks to accommodate shipping, arose out of expediency. With funding in short supply, it proved more feasible to ship ores mined nearby via rail instead of barge.
As a result of these changes, the Tucurui Dam, which was estimated to cost US$3.6 billion when first conceived in 1974, ended up costing more than &5.5 billion when it was delivered 12 years later.
In fact, megaprojects are notorious for the megaproblems they bring. “There is a paradox here” according to Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzilius and Werner Rothengatter, authors of Megaprojects and Risk [Cambridge University Press]. While “more and much larger infrastructure projects are being proposed and built around the world,” they say, “it is becoming clear that many such projects have strikingly poor performance records in terms of economy, environment and public support.”
Over Troubled Waters
Politics can delay projects for years and run up project costs, while incurring even higher opportunity costs for stakeholders. Case in point: The Woodrow Wilson Bridge, long familiar to workers in Washington, D.C., USA, for its frequent delays. Designed to carry 75,000 cars per day, the bridge sees more than 200,000 vehicles daily. Although both the U.S. states of Maryland and Virginia recognized the need to improve the bridge, it took more than a decade before work could begin.
“For years, the governors of Maryland and Virginia battled over which state should pay for cost overruns and which would own the bridge,” according to Washington Business Forward. That squabbling reportedly led to $300 million in cost overruns.
Other groups saw the snarled bridge traffic as an opportunity to promote their own agenda, namely expanding the capital city’s metro system by building a rail line right over the bridge. This strategy meant to keep businesses in Washington’s urban center, thus discouraging suburban sprawl. Still other groups believed increasing the number of lanes on the Wilson Bridge would alleviate the costly snarl.
With so many stakeholders, more project managers wisely build dispute resolution tactics right into a project’s overall plan, says Patrick , director of the Melbourne, Australia-based project management firm, Mosaic Project Services Pty Ltd. When disputes first arise, he says, outside experts might appraise the situation and offer their recommendations.
As a next step, mediators might enter the picture to work out a compromise. Failing that, arbitration – where solutions are imposed – could follow. By progressing through these steps, expensive, time-consuming litigation is a last resort.
If the process sounds easy, it isn’t. You must understand when to take each step, says. For example, if a mediator comes on board too soon, “the parties may still feel disenfranchised and uncommitted to resolution,” he says. If project manager wait too long to introduce a mediator, stakeholders may develop hard feelings.
In some instances, however, there simply isn’t enough time for an incremental escalation of dispute resolution tactics. Architects and urban planners Andres Duany and Elizabeth Platter-Zyberk have devised a faster negotiating method, namely intensive multiday planning sessions called charrettes (the term comes from the week-long exhibits held by graduating French art students).
Working with planning and zoning officials, project managers devise a plan for how approvals will be obtained and what individuals should be brought into the charrette process. Then comes the charrette itself, which may occur at or near the project site. During a series of meetings, engineers, builders and designers discuss plans with politicians and local advocacy groups to promote universal buy-in.
Project planners even may create a working design office at the meeting site, so suggestions and agreed changes can be incorporated as they’re being discussed. When the process concludes, the approved plan can be publicized.
The Cost Runneth Over
When plans first emerged to replace the East Span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, initial cost estimates were put at $1.5 billion. Four years later, the estimated cost rose to $2.87 billion, according to Engineering News Record (ENR). In fact, 90 percent of megaprojects of megaprojects undertaken in 20 nations experienced cost overruns, according to Flyvbjerg and his team. The typical project comes in about 28 percent over budget, the groups study found.
As for the causes, the Danish-funded group report that project sponsors can understate costs and overstate benefits to win over policy makers. “Distortions are worst in developing countries but also are widespread in the U.S. and other advanced economies.”
But in some cases, everyone involved I the project planning phase can fall victim to overly optimistic expectations. “Schedules for programs have become increasingly more aggressive, contracts have become increasingly more restrictive and start dates are continually pushed back without corresponding relief on the back end, resulting in extremely compressed schedules,” according to Ron Stroup, certification and safety lead with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Warren P. Naylor, system safety manager with European aerospace and defense firm BAE Systems.
The two authored an FAA study titled “Cost & Schedule – The Overlooked Hazards” that focused on safety and its relationship to cost overruns. They noted that sometimes fast-track schedules can’t be changed. However, the projects themselves can be run more effectively.
The authors suggest several more efficient strategies. For example, with some projects, safety engineering is kept separate from the development team, resulting in two teams with disconnected goals. But if the groups merge, their goals will be consistent, Stroup and Naylor suggest. What’s more, project managers gain a clearer understanding of how those schedules may affect safety and quality and then address the resulting trade-offs.
A Technology Love Story
Still other megaprojects flounder when their starting point is a technological solution in search of a problem. Consider magnetic levitation (maglev) trains. At first glance, maglev would seem to be the most elegant form of mass transit ever conceived. Cars whisk along silently at 300 miles per hour supported only by a magnetic field. Germany, wishing to secure its leadership in the nascent technology, has spent millions developing a prototype that proved capable of carrying passengers. As part of a German development group, Siemens and Thyssen Krupp were just months away from beginning a $6 billion, 185-mile train route connecting Berlin to Hamburg when the project was summarily halted.
Environmental groups voiced concern over the potential health hazards of magnetic fields. Other critics contended that conventional high-speed rail systems already used in France and Japan could transport people nearly as fast at far less cost. Like the cancelled Concorde supersonic jetliner service, maglev may have been a solution in search of a problem.
Again, here is a case of a project becoming mired in politics after millions already had been spent developing it. The remedy might have been to hold a charrette along the lines of those organized by Duany and Platter-Zyberk so differences could be openly discussed early on.
Enlisting private funding sources also can minimize bureaucratic red tape. Those who provide this funding are more likely to favor a solution that works best from an economic standpoint than to champion a particular technological solution. In fact, many non-industrialized nations such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong are developing privately funded projects such as large-scale toll roads.
Inefficient Designs
In many land-scarce urban areas, new highways are no longer practical. The challenge is to revamp existing traffic networks to carry an ever-growing volume of traffic. Systems to automatically collect tolls or alert motorists to traffic delays can help, but they only work well when the highway’s design is optimized so drivers can navigate with maximum efficiency.
That’s where simulation can help: The National Advanced Driving Simulator at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa, USA, for example, can duplicate what it will be like to navigate the most complex tangle of interchanging highways before any work actually begins. “It’s a very high-fidelity virtual environment,” says Yiannis Papelis, chief technical officer at the facility.
A driver sitting in an actual car inside the boxlike simulator is surrounded by screens that depict the virtual road, along with up to 50 computer-generated cars, Papelis says. Simulations can feign varying weather conditions, speed and traffic flows. By using several human test subjects, planners get a sense of how driver-friendly their designs are before actual construction begins.
The simulation becomes, in effect, a virtual prototype, Papelis says, and problems that become evident through the simulation can be remedied in the design.
Said and Done
Large projects, by their very nature, consume vast amounts of capital over lengthy periods, reducing the flexibility in development planning, according to Cooma, Australia-based consulting firm SMEC. Moreover, megaprojects are “extremely complex to manage and seemed in some cases to be beyond any one’s control,” a report on the firm’s Web site explains. What’s more, their scale implies “that the environmental impact would be substantial but probably not readily calculable in advance.”
The firm notes that these concerns first addressed in the 1970s and 1980s by organizations like the World Bank remain unresolved in some cases. “But there is no evidence that the size of infrastructure projects has been constrained,” according to the company.
Project managers who know how to incorporate problem-minimizing strategies like charrettes, proper oversight, innovative funding and simulations into their plans will be much in demand.
Mark Ingebretsen writes the Daily Scan column for the Wall Street Journal Online. His latest book, Why Companies Fail, was published in May.
Under Scrutiny
In today’s world of fast-moving capital and rapidly expanding engineering know-how, there’s no shortage of envelope-pushing ideas.
Redeveloping Hong Kong’s International Airport. Replaced by the sprawling Chek Lap Kok, Hong Kong’s now-vacant airport rests on some of the world’s most expensive real estate. Plans call for housing for an estimated 250,000 residents plus improved transportation arteries, along with parks and recreation.
As might be expected with a project of this size, the hardest task can be devising a master plan that all stakeholders will sign onto. Already disagreements have been reported over plans to reclaim some of Hong Kong’s harbor for the project. Others have raised concerns over possible pollution resulting from the construction and still others have objected to what they claim is lack of a unified design theme.
Dallas Trinity River Corridor Projects. At present, the Trinity River is only a “seasonal creek.” But planners in Dallas hope to transform it into a multiseason recreation area that would include several lakes, greenbelt areas and parks to serve as a catalyst for further development along its borders – all at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion.
Planning has taken years. Even now, there are six proposed routes for a parkway that will traverse the area. Nevertheless, project planners have sought to make their designs stand the test of time by attempting to envision how the city will make use of the area midway through this century.
National Monorail Grid. Some planners believe a nationwide monorail network could seamlessly link metro systems carrying passengers and freight with longer-range trains traveling at 250 miles per hour.
One proposed solution would locate the monorail right above existing highways in metropolitan areas by covering the highways. While this would certainly present challenges to designers, it would provide needed room for housing and other urban development. Space above the highways might even be sold to developers to help pay for the monorail system.
The Bering Straits Tunnel. A tunnel linking Siberia with Alaska could greatly speed the flow of global commerce. At an estimated cost of $40 billion, the Bering Straits tunnel easily would be the largest privately funded transportation project in history.
With two islands conveniently located midway across the strait, the actual underwater distances aren’t appreciably greater than those overcome in building the Chunnel connecting the United Kingdom with France. However, the real challenge may well be linking both ends of the completed project with major population centers on either side of the world. Presently the communities on the Alaskan side of the Bering Strait aren’t even reachable by road way or rail, and the Russian region is said to be even more remote.
政治斗爭、預(yù)算超支和設(shè)計缺陷困擾著許多的大型項目。項目經(jīng)理可以通過一些創(chuàng)新和策略來避免上述令人頭痛的狀況。
建造圖庫魯伊大壩是一件異常艱巨的工作。圖庫魯伊大壩座落于巴西東北部偏遠繁茂的亞馬遜地區(qū)，大壩和相鄰的筑堤用長達12.5公里的混凝土圍成了一個面積達2850平方公里的湖區(qū)。
然而在圖庫魯伊大壩的建設(shè)過程中，問題突現(xiàn)出來：經(jīng)常會發(fā)生一些問題招致代價昂貴的決策，迫使原計劃變更。某些決策是在政治抗議的背景下做出的，比如使用昂貴的巴西水泥替代哥倫比亞的原材料。另外一些決策則起因于預(yù)期的資金未到位，例如，大壩水電站推遲三年投入使用。還有部分決策，像廢棄一種水閘系統(tǒng)以適應(yīng)運輸要求則是由費用原因引起的。在資金供給短缺時，通過火車取代駁船運輸?shù)V石則更為可行。
這些變更導(dǎo)致的一個結(jié)果是，在1974年估計預(yù)算36億美元的圖庫魯伊大壩最終在12年后交付時花費超過55億美元。
實際上，大型項目通常會因其導(dǎo)致的問題而聲名狼藉?！禡egaprojects and Risk》一書的作者本特·弗萊杰格、尼爾斯·布魯茲利斯和沃納·羅森加特爾表示：“現(xiàn)在存在一個矛盾：在全球計劃和建造更多更大建筑項目的同時，有個趨勢變得愈加明顯，即諸如此類的項目在經(jīng)濟、環(huán)境和公共支持上的記錄表現(xiàn)明顯差勁。
解決糾紛
政治因素會拖延項目數(shù)年并耗盡項目預(yù)算，而且還會導(dǎo)致更高的潛在費用。如下即是一個案例：伍德魯·威爾遜大橋由于其頻繁的推遲開工而廣為美國華盛頓的工人們熟知。大橋的設(shè)計車流量是每天7.5萬輛，而現(xiàn)在每天有超過20萬輛車過橋。盡管美國馬里蘭州和弗吉尼亞州都意識到擴建大橋的必要性，但是實際開工之前卻浪費了超過十年。
Washington Business Forward雜志指出：“數(shù)年來，馬里蘭州和弗吉尼亞州的州長們?yōu)榱祟A(yù)算超支部分的付費方和大橋的所有權(quán)等事情爭吵不休?！睋?jù)說，這些爭吵導(dǎo)致了3億美元的超支。
某些利益集團將大橋混亂的交通狀況當(dāng)作是促進自己計劃的機會，即通過修建一條橋上鐵路來擴展首都的地鐵系統(tǒng)。這個策略意味著將商業(yè)保留在華盛頓市區(qū)，這樣會限制郊區(qū)的蔓延。而另一些集團認(rèn)為增加威爾遜橋上車道的數(shù)量會減輕耗費巨大的交通混亂。
由于存在如此多的項目干系人，更多明智的項目經(jīng)理將糾紛解決方法寫入總體項目計劃中，帕特里克·韋弗如是說。韋弗是澳大利亞墨爾本的項目管理公司Mosaic項目服務(wù)公司的總監(jiān)。他認(rèn)為，當(dāng)紛爭發(fā)生時，外部專家會評估現(xiàn)狀并提供建議。
下一步，調(diào)節(jié)人會參與進來指定出折衷方案。調(diào)解失敗的話，就會訴諸仲裁，這樣，解決方案就是強制的。以上步驟失敗之后，耗時又昂貴的訴訟就是最后的手段了。
韋弗說，這套流程比較復(fù)雜，你必須了解采取每一步驟的適當(dāng)時機。例如，如果調(diào)解人過早地發(fā)揮作用，各方會感覺權(quán)利被剝奪而不會認(rèn)同調(diào)解人的方案。如果項目經(jīng)理讓調(diào)解人介入太晚的話，項目干系人會相互產(chǎn)生反感。
然而，在某些情況下，沒有足夠的時間執(zhí)行層層上報的糾紛解決方法。城市規(guī)劃和建筑師安德魯斯·杜安尼和伊麗莎白·普拉特－茲伊貝克設(shè)計了一種快速的協(xié)商機制，名為專家研討會議，實際上是一種多日集中計劃會議。
項目經(jīng)理與區(qū)域規(guī)劃官員合作設(shè)計出一種機制以確定參與研討會議的人員及達成共識的方法。接下來，研討會議會在項目現(xiàn)場或者附近召開。在一系列的會議上，工程師、建筑師和設(shè)計師與政客和當(dāng)?shù)刂С终呔陀媱澾M行討論以促成全體人員的接受。
項目規(guī)劃者甚至可以在會議現(xiàn)場設(shè)置一個設(shè)計室，這樣，建議和批準(zhǔn)的變更可以在它們被討論的同時被具體展現(xiàn)出來。當(dāng)結(jié)論確定下來后，批準(zhǔn)的計劃會發(fā)布出來。
避免超支
當(dāng)替換舊金山奧克蘭海灣大橋東側(cè)跨徑的計劃最初被提出時，預(yù)算是15億美元。四年后，據(jù)Engineering News Record報道，預(yù)算上升至28.7億美元。本特·弗萊杰格及其團隊認(rèn)為，在20個國家內(nèi)開展的大型項目中，實際上有90％經(jīng)歷過預(yù)算超支。他們研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，典型的項目超支大約為28％。
Danish公司報告顯示，超支的原因是由于項目贊助人低估了成本并且高估了收益以獲取決策者的支持?！巴崆聦嵲诎l(fā)展中國家非常嚴(yán)重，在美國等發(fā)達經(jīng)濟體中也廣泛存在?！?br>
但在某些情況下，項目計劃階段的每個人都可能成為過度樂觀估計的受害人?！绊椖窟M度變得越來越緊張；合同變得越來越嚴(yán)格；開工日期持續(xù)推后而結(jié)束時間卻沒有相應(yīng)延遲，這一切導(dǎo)致了極端壓縮的項目計劃?！崩省に固佤斊蘸腿A倫·P·內(nèi)勒做出如上解釋。斯特魯普是美國聯(lián)邦航空管理局（FAA）認(rèn)證及安全主管，內(nèi)勒是歐洲航天和防務(wù)公司BAE system公司的系統(tǒng)安全經(jīng)理。
斯特魯普和內(nèi)勒合著了一份題為《預(yù)算與進度——忽視的危險》的FAA研究報告，此報告關(guān)注于安全及其與預(yù)算超支的關(guān)系。他們注意到有時候快速跟進的進度不可更改，然而，項目本身卻可以更有效的運營。
兩位作者推薦了幾種有效的策略。例如，有些項目中的安全工程與開發(fā)團隊是分開的，這樣導(dǎo)致了兩個團隊的目標(biāo)不一致。如果兩個團隊合并，他們的目標(biāo)是一致起來。還有，項目經(jīng)理要清楚了解進度會如何影響安全和質(zhì)量，然后做出結(jié)果權(quán)衡。
技術(shù)悖論
還有一些目的是開發(fā)技術(shù)解決方案的大型項目步履蹣跚。看看磁懸浮鐵路吧，乍一看，磁懸浮是最優(yōu)雅的大規(guī)模運輸形式，列車沿著磁軌以300英里每小時的速度安靜地飛馳而過。德國耗資數(shù)百萬歐元研制載人磁懸浮原型以期保持他們在這個新興領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位。作為德國研發(fā)集團的一分子，西門子公司和蒂森克虜伯公司將開啟一個耗資60億歐元，長達185英里連接柏林和漢堡的鐵路線，但距開工數(shù)月前，項目被緊急叫停。
環(huán)保者擔(dān)憂磁懸浮列車對健康存在潛在危害。其他批評者聲稱在法國和日本已經(jīng)成功應(yīng)用的高速鐵路可以達到同等運力并且費用低廉。類似于先前被取消的協(xié)和式飛機，磁懸浮可能會變成技術(shù)解決方案而停滯不前。
這又是一個已經(jīng)耗資數(shù)百萬的項目由于政治因素受阻的案例?？尚械难a救措施是舉行那種類似于杜安尼和普拉特－茲伊貝克組織過的那種專家研討會，這樣可以及早地討論不同的意見。
私募資金同樣可以減少官僚主義形式。私募資金提供者更加傾向于經(jīng)濟上最優(yōu)解決方案而不是技術(shù)上的獨特方案。事實上，許多象菲律賓、馬來西亞、泰國和香港這樣的非工業(yè)國家和地區(qū)正在開發(fā)如大型收費公路等私募投資的項目。
有效設(shè)計
對于缺乏土地的城區(qū)，新式公路顯得不太實際。挑戰(zhàn)在于如何改建已有交通網(wǎng)絡(luò)以承載不斷增長的交通流量。自動收費系統(tǒng)或交通阻塞報警裝置會有些作用，但是只有在公路優(yōu)化設(shè)計能使駕駛者得到最有效的導(dǎo)航時，這些設(shè)施才起作用。
模擬確實會很有幫助：美國愛荷華大學(xué)的美國高級駕駛模擬器實驗室可以模擬公路交叉路口最復(fù)雜的混亂情形。實驗室首席技術(shù)官伊安尼斯·帕比利斯說：“這套模擬器是一個仿真程度很高的虛擬環(huán)境?！?br>
帕比利斯說：“駕駛者坐在像盒子一樣的模擬器里面的一輛真車?yán)铮h(huán)繞四周的屏幕顯示出虛擬的路況和50輛計算機模擬出來的汽車?！蹦M器還可以模擬出不同的天氣狀況、速度和交通流量。通過使用幾個人員測試項目，規(guī)劃者在開始具體實施建造之前就可以對他們自己的設(shè)計友好性有所把握。
帕比利斯說：“實際上，模擬器變成了一個虛擬的原型機，模擬出的任何明顯問題都會在設(shè)計時避免。
遺留問題
澳大利亞咨詢公司SMEC的庫馬認(rèn)為，大型項目本質(zhì)上會長期的耗費大量資金，這樣減少了項目規(guī)劃的靈活性。SMEC網(wǎng)站上的一份報告稱：“大型項目的管理極端復(fù)雜，在某些情況下好像任何人都控制不了?！倍遥鼈兊囊?guī)?？赡馨凳荆簩Νh(huán)境的影響是確定的，但可能難以預(yù)計影響的程度。
SMEC注意到，這些問題早在1970和1980年代就被世界銀行這樣的組織提出，但由于某些原因至今仍未解決。他們認(rèn)為，沒有證據(jù)表明建筑項目的規(guī)模因此受到限制。
掌握如何將象研討會、嚴(yán)格監(jiān)督、多樣融資和模擬等問題解決策略融合進項目計劃的項目經(jīng)理的前景被普遍看好。
作者簡介：Mark Ingebretsen為《華爾街日報》網(wǎng)絡(luò)版撰寫每日觀察專欄。他的新作《Why Companies Fail》已于2003年5月出版。
附文：案例分析
在當(dāng)今社會，資金快速流動，工程經(jīng)驗迅速共享，人們不能對創(chuàng)新思想有所保留。
●重新規(guī)劃香港國際機場。被正在擴建的香港赤臘角機場取代的閑置機場座落于世界上最昂貴的土地上。此規(guī)劃需要安排約有25萬居民的住房，包括交通干線、公園和娛樂設(shè)施等。
諸如此類的大型項目最為困難的工作在于設(shè)計一個總體規(guī)劃并讓所有項目干系人接受。在回收利用香港部分港口的問題上已存在爭論，可能的建筑污染問題也備受關(guān)注，還有部分的反對意見來源于缺乏一個統(tǒng)一的設(shè)計主題。
●達拉斯三叉河走廊工程?，F(xiàn)在的三叉河僅僅是一條“季節(jié)性河流”。不過，規(guī)劃者希望將它變成一個多季節(jié)的娛樂區(qū)域，包括湖區(qū)，綠化帶和具有未來開發(fā)潛力的公園。以上這些項目耗資預(yù)算達12億美元。
規(guī)劃過程就用了好幾年。直到現(xiàn)在，橫跨此區(qū)域的公園道路路線仍有六條提議。然而，規(guī)劃者試圖預(yù)見未來半個世紀(jì)達拉斯將會如何使用這個區(qū)域，以此來尋求使其設(shè)計經(jīng)受時間考驗。
●國家單軌鐵路網(wǎng)。部分規(guī)劃者相信，一個全國范圍內(nèi)的單軌鐵路網(wǎng)會無縫連接客貨運地鐵和時速達250英里每小時的長途列車。
一個提議方案是在公路上方修建單軌鐵路來覆蓋公路網(wǎng)。很顯然，這個方案會給設(shè)計者帶來挑戰(zhàn)，這需要提供住房和其他的城市用地。公路上方的空間甚至?xí)毁u給開發(fā)者以支付單軌鐵路的建設(shè)費用。
●白令海峽隧道。連接西伯利亞和阿拉斯加的隧道會極大地促進全球貿(mào)易。預(yù)計耗資400億美元的白令海峽隧道工程可能會成為歷史上最大的私募投資運輸建筑項目。
有兩個島嶼座落于海峽中間，這樣，實際的海底長度不會比英法海底隧道更長。然而，真正的挑戰(zhàn)在于如何連接世界兩極人口中心已有的工程。目前，白令海峽阿拉斯加端沒有公路或鐵路通往人類社區(qū)，據(jù)說俄羅斯端的距離更為遙遠。
原文：
Taming the Beast
By Mark Ingebretsen
Political infighting, cost overruns and faulty designs characterize many large projects. With a little project ingenuity and know-how, project managers can prevent these headaches.
Building the Tucurui Dam would not be easy. Located in northeastern Brazil’s lush and remote Amazon region, the dam and its adjacent dykes would encompass some 12,500 meters of concrete, creating a 2,850 square-kilometer lake.
However, problems cropped up during the Tucurui Dam’s construction – issues that often necessitated expensive decisions to change the original plan. Some decisions, including the use of more expensive Brazilian cement instead of material from neighboring Columbia, were made after political outcry. Others, such as the three-year delay in opening the dam’s hydroelectric power plant, resulted when expected funding didn’t materialize. Still other decisions, like the one to abandon a planned system of locks to accommodate shipping, arose out of expediency. With funding in short supply, it proved more feasible to ship ores mined nearby via rail instead of barge.
As a result of these changes, the Tucurui Dam, which was estimated to cost US$3.6 billion when first conceived in 1974, ended up costing more than &5.5 billion when it was delivered 12 years later.
In fact, megaprojects are notorious for the megaproblems they bring. “There is a paradox here” according to Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzilius and Werner Rothengatter, authors of Megaprojects and Risk [Cambridge University Press]. While “more and much larger infrastructure projects are being proposed and built around the world,” they say, “it is becoming clear that many such projects have strikingly poor performance records in terms of economy, environment and public support.”
Over Troubled Waters
Politics can delay projects for years and run up project costs, while incurring even higher opportunity costs for stakeholders. Case in point: The Woodrow Wilson Bridge, long familiar to workers in Washington, D.C., USA, for its frequent delays. Designed to carry 75,000 cars per day, the bridge sees more than 200,000 vehicles daily. Although both the U.S. states of Maryland and Virginia recognized the need to improve the bridge, it took more than a decade before work could begin.
“For years, the governors of Maryland and Virginia battled over which state should pay for cost overruns and which would own the bridge,” according to Washington Business Forward. That squabbling reportedly led to $300 million in cost overruns.
Other groups saw the snarled bridge traffic as an opportunity to promote their own agenda, namely expanding the capital city’s metro system by building a rail line right over the bridge. This strategy meant to keep businesses in Washington’s urban center, thus discouraging suburban sprawl. Still other groups believed increasing the number of lanes on the Wilson Bridge would alleviate the costly snarl.
With so many stakeholders, more project managers wisely build dispute resolution tactics right into a project’s overall plan, says Patrick , director of the Melbourne, Australia-based project management firm, Mosaic Project Services Pty Ltd. When disputes first arise, he says, outside experts might appraise the situation and offer their recommendations.
As a next step, mediators might enter the picture to work out a compromise. Failing that, arbitration – where solutions are imposed – could follow. By progressing through these steps, expensive, time-consuming litigation is a last resort.
If the process sounds easy, it isn’t. You must understand when to take each step, says. For example, if a mediator comes on board too soon, “the parties may still feel disenfranchised and uncommitted to resolution,” he says. If project manager wait too long to introduce a mediator, stakeholders may develop hard feelings.
In some instances, however, there simply isn’t enough time for an incremental escalation of dispute resolution tactics. Architects and urban planners Andres Duany and Elizabeth Platter-Zyberk have devised a faster negotiating method, namely intensive multiday planning sessions called charrettes (the term comes from the week-long exhibits held by graduating French art students).
Working with planning and zoning officials, project managers devise a plan for how approvals will be obtained and what individuals should be brought into the charrette process. Then comes the charrette itself, which may occur at or near the project site. During a series of meetings, engineers, builders and designers discuss plans with politicians and local advocacy groups to promote universal buy-in.
Project planners even may create a working design office at the meeting site, so suggestions and agreed changes can be incorporated as they’re being discussed. When the process concludes, the approved plan can be publicized.
The Cost Runneth Over
When plans first emerged to replace the East Span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, initial cost estimates were put at $1.5 billion. Four years later, the estimated cost rose to $2.87 billion, according to Engineering News Record (ENR). In fact, 90 percent of megaprojects of megaprojects undertaken in 20 nations experienced cost overruns, according to Flyvbjerg and his team. The typical project comes in about 28 percent over budget, the groups study found.
As for the causes, the Danish-funded group report that project sponsors can understate costs and overstate benefits to win over policy makers. “Distortions are worst in developing countries but also are widespread in the U.S. and other advanced economies.”
But in some cases, everyone involved I the project planning phase can fall victim to overly optimistic expectations. “Schedules for programs have become increasingly more aggressive, contracts have become increasingly more restrictive and start dates are continually pushed back without corresponding relief on the back end, resulting in extremely compressed schedules,” according to Ron Stroup, certification and safety lead with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Warren P. Naylor, system safety manager with European aerospace and defense firm BAE Systems.
The two authored an FAA study titled “Cost & Schedule – The Overlooked Hazards” that focused on safety and its relationship to cost overruns. They noted that sometimes fast-track schedules can’t be changed. However, the projects themselves can be run more effectively.
The authors suggest several more efficient strategies. For example, with some projects, safety engineering is kept separate from the development team, resulting in two teams with disconnected goals. But if the groups merge, their goals will be consistent, Stroup and Naylor suggest. What’s more, project managers gain a clearer understanding of how those schedules may affect safety and quality and then address the resulting trade-offs.
A Technology Love Story
Still other megaprojects flounder when their starting point is a technological solution in search of a problem. Consider magnetic levitation (maglev) trains. At first glance, maglev would seem to be the most elegant form of mass transit ever conceived. Cars whisk along silently at 300 miles per hour supported only by a magnetic field. Germany, wishing to secure its leadership in the nascent technology, has spent millions developing a prototype that proved capable of carrying passengers. As part of a German development group, Siemens and Thyssen Krupp were just months away from beginning a $6 billion, 185-mile train route connecting Berlin to Hamburg when the project was summarily halted.
Environmental groups voiced concern over the potential health hazards of magnetic fields. Other critics contended that conventional high-speed rail systems already used in France and Japan could transport people nearly as fast at far less cost. Like the cancelled Concorde supersonic jetliner service, maglev may have been a solution in search of a problem.
Again, here is a case of a project becoming mired in politics after millions already had been spent developing it. The remedy might have been to hold a charrette along the lines of those organized by Duany and Platter-Zyberk so differences could be openly discussed early on.
Enlisting private funding sources also can minimize bureaucratic red tape. Those who provide this funding are more likely to favor a solution that works best from an economic standpoint than to champion a particular technological solution. In fact, many non-industrialized nations such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong are developing privately funded projects such as large-scale toll roads.
Inefficient Designs
In many land-scarce urban areas, new highways are no longer practical. The challenge is to revamp existing traffic networks to carry an ever-growing volume of traffic. Systems to automatically collect tolls or alert motorists to traffic delays can help, but they only work well when the highway’s design is optimized so drivers can navigate with maximum efficiency.
That’s where simulation can help: The National Advanced Driving Simulator at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa, USA, for example, can duplicate what it will be like to navigate the most complex tangle of interchanging highways before any work actually begins. “It’s a very high-fidelity virtual environment,” says Yiannis Papelis, chief technical officer at the facility.
A driver sitting in an actual car inside the boxlike simulator is surrounded by screens that depict the virtual road, along with up to 50 computer-generated cars, Papelis says. Simulations can feign varying weather conditions, speed and traffic flows. By using several human test subjects, planners get a sense of how driver-friendly their designs are before actual construction begins.
The simulation becomes, in effect, a virtual prototype, Papelis says, and problems that become evident through the simulation can be remedied in the design.
Said and Done
Large projects, by their very nature, consume vast amounts of capital over lengthy periods, reducing the flexibility in development planning, according to Cooma, Australia-based consulting firm SMEC. Moreover, megaprojects are “extremely complex to manage and seemed in some cases to be beyond any one’s control,” a report on the firm’s Web site explains. What’s more, their scale implies “that the environmental impact would be substantial but probably not readily calculable in advance.”
The firm notes that these concerns first addressed in the 1970s and 1980s by organizations like the World Bank remain unresolved in some cases. “But there is no evidence that the size of infrastructure projects has been constrained,” according to the company.
Project managers who know how to incorporate problem-minimizing strategies like charrettes, proper oversight, innovative funding and simulations into their plans will be much in demand.
Mark Ingebretsen writes the Daily Scan column for the Wall Street Journal Online. His latest book, Why Companies Fail, was published in May.
Under Scrutiny
In today’s world of fast-moving capital and rapidly expanding engineering know-how, there’s no shortage of envelope-pushing ideas.
Redeveloping Hong Kong’s International Airport. Replaced by the sprawling Chek Lap Kok, Hong Kong’s now-vacant airport rests on some of the world’s most expensive real estate. Plans call for housing for an estimated 250,000 residents plus improved transportation arteries, along with parks and recreation.
As might be expected with a project of this size, the hardest task can be devising a master plan that all stakeholders will sign onto. Already disagreements have been reported over plans to reclaim some of Hong Kong’s harbor for the project. Others have raised concerns over possible pollution resulting from the construction and still others have objected to what they claim is lack of a unified design theme.
Dallas Trinity River Corridor Projects. At present, the Trinity River is only a “seasonal creek.” But planners in Dallas hope to transform it into a multiseason recreation area that would include several lakes, greenbelt areas and parks to serve as a catalyst for further development along its borders – all at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion.
Planning has taken years. Even now, there are six proposed routes for a parkway that will traverse the area. Nevertheless, project planners have sought to make their designs stand the test of time by attempting to envision how the city will make use of the area midway through this century.
National Monorail Grid. Some planners believe a nationwide monorail network could seamlessly link metro systems carrying passengers and freight with longer-range trains traveling at 250 miles per hour.
One proposed solution would locate the monorail right above existing highways in metropolitan areas by covering the highways. While this would certainly present challenges to designers, it would provide needed room for housing and other urban development. Space above the highways might even be sold to developers to help pay for the monorail system.
The Bering Straits Tunnel. A tunnel linking Siberia with Alaska could greatly speed the flow of global commerce. At an estimated cost of $40 billion, the Bering Straits tunnel easily would be the largest privately funded transportation project in history.
With two islands conveniently located midway across the strait, the actual underwater distances aren’t appreciably greater than those overcome in building the Chunnel connecting the United Kingdom with France. However, the real challenge may well be linking both ends of the completed project with major population centers on either side of the world. Presently the communities on the Alaskan side of the Bering Strait aren’t even reachable by road way or rail, and the Russian region is said to be even more remote.